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Perspective by incongruity in the performance of dialectical ironic analysis: a 
disciplined approach   
Abstract 
The importance of dialectic to sociological thought has been recognised by many of the 
discipline’s most eminent thinkers. Adopting a dialectical world view infused with irony 
provokes insights revealing logical contradictions, so opening up possibilities for the 
development of alternative interpretations of the social world. There is, however, very 
little in the way of method to support the development of dialectical irony as a key 
analytical tool for the social sciences.  This paper seeks to remedy this deficit. Drawing 
on  three key examples (trained incapacity, functional stupidity and interpassivity) the 
paper examines Kenneth Burke’s ‘perspective by incongruity’ as a means for 
interrogating the dialectical moment, so contributing towards the development of 
dialectical ironic analysis within a methodology of humour.  
Keywords 
Comic frame, functional stupidity, interpassivity, methodology of humour, planned 
incongruity, sociological imagination, trained incapacity 
Introduction 
Many eminent thinkers have alluded to the importance of dialectic to sociological 
thought1 and while Louis Schneider (1971) admits that the term is troublesome for 
sociologists, he notes that what he calls a dialectical bent has pervaded much 
sociological thought for over two centuries.  One of the more troublesome aspects is 




reasoned argument and opposition are involved. In teasing out the ambiguities that 
surround the term, Schneider (1971:667) identifies a number of meaning clusters that 
are relevant to social scientists, including: unanticipated consequences; adaptations that 
once made obstruct more effective ones; contradiction, paradox and negation; goal 
shifts; and the dissolution of conflict in the coalescence of opposites (Schneider 
1971:667). From this list it will be immediately apparent that dialectic is a key concept 
in the understanding of the world as irremediably governed by the law of irony, which 
Henri-Frederic Amiel (1906:np) sets out succinctly as follows:  
…life is a perpetual combat; it wills that which it wills not, and wills not that it 
wills. Hence what I call the law of irony – that is to say, the refutation of the self by 
itself, the concrete realization of the absurd. 
Indeed, for US philosopher Kenneth Burke irony is the literary form of dialectic (Burke 
1941). Yet, Brown (1983) notes that it is only in relatively modern times that the link 
between dialectic and irony has been recognised, the reflexive moment of reversal 
inherent in dialectic only being seen as an essentially ironic movement by late 
eighteenth/early nineteenth century philosophers (notably Schlegel and his critics,  
Hegel and Kierkegaard). The link is irresistible: 
[The ironist] simultaneously asserts two or more logically contradictory meanings 
such that, in the silence between the two, the deeper meanings of both may emerge. 
This deeper meaning is dialectical. It does not inhere in either the initial literal 
assertion or its negation, but rather in the dialectical tension and completion that 
ironic awareness sets off between them. (Brown 1983:544) 
Dialectical irony is structural and provokes insights revealing logical contradictions 




(Watson 2015a).  Thus, the dialectical moment opens up possibilities for the 
development of alternative interpretations of the social world. From this the importance 
of dialectical irony to the development of sociological thought will readily be 
appreciated as a means by which to de-realise those meanings that have become reified 
in discourse. Arguably, it is the very ambiguity ‘infecting’ dialectic (Hook, 1939) that 
renders the dialectical world view so potent to sociological thought. But this still leaves 
another problem, since as Schneider (1971) notes, there is no dialectical method as such, 
at least no method that is of use to sociologists conducting empirical research. True, 
Gurvitch (1962, cited in Schneider, 1971) does refer to a number of analytical 
categories as dialectical method, but Schneider dismisses this as ‘glib’, as exposition 
rather than discovery, and ‘suggesting nothing of method’.  Kaufmann (1965) too, in 
Hegel: a reinterpretation, rejects the notion of dialectic as a method of discovery but 
accepts such a thing as a ‘dialectical world view’ which he regards as ‘immensely 
fruitful’. Thus, while sociologists may arrive at important insights by adopting a 
perspective infused with irony this falls short of constituting a method for the 
investigation of the social world. If dialectical irony is acknowledged to be a key 
construct for understanding the social then neglect of this in empirical analysis 
constitutes a serious omission which threatens to reduce the ability of the social sciences 
to arrive at insightful theory. This goes generally for all research conducted within a 
comic frame which Burke (1984a:np) defines as ‘the methodic view of human antics as 
a comedy, albeit as a comedy ever on the verge of the most disastrous tragedy’. Very 
few have heeded Burke’s advice that ‘whenever and wherever possible, one should 
write comedy’ (1974: 312). (Certainly not Burke himself, though he has his moments). 




integral to the human condition; at the very least to reject a potentially insightful 
methodological approach  for the social sciences (Watson, 2015a). 
This paper offers a contribution towards remedying this situation by positing Kenneth 
Burke’s perspective by incongruity or, as he elsewhere has it planned incongruity (PI), 
as a means by which to examine the dialectical moment between oppositional terms in 
order to arrive at useful sociological knowledge. Dialectical irony involves constructing 
a statement that is open to ambivalent clarifications. Perspective by incongruity presents 
a means for capturing this dialectical moment, held in the contradictory space between 
oppositions. Through this PI affords explanatory power, provides a critique of 
commonly held assumptions, and opens up directions for further research. The paper 
thus contributes to the development of a methodology of humour (Watson, 2015a,b) in 
the social sciences. The paper proceeds as follows: first, I set out Burke’s construct of 
perspective by incongruity. I then furnish some examples in the social sciences and 
conclude by gathering together the threads of my argument, putting forward a case for 
the significance of dialectical irony to research in the social sciences. 
Perspective by incongruity 
Kenneth Burke is best known as a literary philosopher, but he has been ‘lurking in 
sociologists’ footnotes since the 1930’s’ (Overington 1977:131). Certainly, he has much 
to offer sociology though his idiosyncratic style has been considered an impediment. 
Indeed, Overington goes so far as to suggest that his work requires translation in order 
to make sense to sociologists.   A more recent eclecticism among sociologists may 
render this statement less true than it was 40 years ago and we are perhaps more ready 




As a philosopher Burke is difficult to pigeonhole and his enthusiasms range widely. His 
most significant contribution was the development of dramatism as a means to analyse 
human relationships and in this he was a key influence on Erving Goffman (Jaworski, 
2000). A major concern was with motivation. Burke  argues that associations of terms 
create particular meanings and determine certain courses of action. To call a death 
‘murder’, for example, is to put in train a particular course of events, most notably a 
search for the perpetrator (Overington 1977). Thus, Burke constructs motive as a 
‘distinctly linguistic product’ (Burke 1984b:35). Certain terms therefore ‘stick together’ 
creating an apparent coherence which, considered ideologically, constitutes our 
assumptions about the world and guides our actions.  Burke proposes perspective by 
incongruity as a dialectical epistemology aimed at interrupting these associations in 
order to arrive at what he calls a ‘truer’ explanation of social relations. 
Burke defines perspective by incongruity as,  
a method for gauging situations by verbal ‘atom cracking’. That is, a word belongs 
by custom to a certain category – and by rational planning you wrench it loose and 
metaphorically apply it to another category. (Burke 1984a:94; emphasis added) 
Fittingly, the term ‘planned incongruity’ can itself be thought of as an example of PI, a 
tension existing in the dialectical moment generated by the juxtaposition of these 
unlikely conjoined terms in which rationality and absurdity meet. Before moving on, 
however, Burke’s understanding of what is meant by ‘rationality’ in the context of the 
‘rational planning’ requires some attention, since it departs in some respects from 
common usage. Rationality, as commonly understood, is the application of reason and 
the search for ‘reason’s traditional consort, Truth’ (Williams 1998: np).  Rationality 




conclusion. For Burke, however, ‘an excess of rationality as so defined adds up to a new 
level of irrationality’ (Burke 1974:319). Pushed to its limits, the logical conclusion is 
reduced to absurdity (Burke 1973). Indeed, this is the tactic of the satirist who ‘Taking 
conditions that are here already…perversely, twistedly, carries them “to the end of the 
line”’ (Burke 1974:318). Burke gives as example, the  entirely rational argument that 
the more as a nation we consume, the greater our need for production, and from this, it 
follows, the greater our prosperity. While there is a limit to what a person may use but 
not what they may waste it follows that ‘If people can be taught to waste 
enough…business need never face saturation point’. Hence, ‘the maximum possible 
consumption is made possible by the maximum possible waste, and therefore…culture 
depends upon a maximum of waste’ (Burke 1974:308; emphasis original). From this 
Burke sees triumphantly, ‘the eternal bull market!’ A conclusion which gains a certain 
amount of ironic force in the light of events of the last decade or so.  
As Burke sees it, the problem lies in rationality’s attempts at ‘purification’ of meaning 
and its stripping out of human motives and desires. Instead, Burke redefines rationality, 
de-privileging it, and by this means de-stabilizing ‘Truth’ (Williams 1998). For Burke, 
rationality is not about resolution of dialectical oppositions (pace Hegel), rather it is 
about multiplicity and perspective, encompassing both the semantic and the poetic 
meaning of a construct. Rationality, as Burke uses it in ‘rational planning’, achieves its 
analytic power through the paradoxical revelation that (like all language) it is 
irremediably dialectic, containing its opposite (‘everything is its other’, Burke 1973:77). 
Thus, an excess of rationality produces irrationality, and therefore to be truly rational, 
rationality has to be less than rational, encompassing the poetic meanings – the 




In light of this, Burke advocates ‘conscientious irresponsibility’ (another planned 
incongruity) as the proper attitude of the academic engaged in comic criticism willing 
‘to follow any idea to the end of the line not because you thought it was the whole story, 
but because you liked the dialectic exercise as such’ (Burke 1953:367). Conscientious 
irresponsibility acknowledges the complexity of the social and refuses to engage in 
reductive processes that strip out ambivalence and irony (Rueckert 1994).  This for 
Burke is why the comic frame as an attitude is so important in critical analysis.   The 
rational planning that PI requires cannot therefore be thought of as a systematic process, 
reducible to a formula for arriving at generative juxtapositions, despite Burke’s 
somewhat scientistic metaphors such as  ‘verbal atom cracking’ – he may, of course, be 
using this term ironically.  
Perspective by incongruity is included in a section of Attitudes towards history called 
the ‘Dictionary of pivotal terms’, pivotal because, ‘taken together they constitute the 
terminological cluster comic critics need for the analysis of society’ (Rueckert 
1994:114). ‘Pivotal’, as metaphor, draws attention to the dialectical intent of these 
terms, key among which for the sociologist are:   Bureaucratisation of the imaginative, 
Casuistic stretching and Clusters. Paradoxically (in Borgesian vein), the ‘Dictionary’ 
constitutes a catalogue of terms for conducting an analysis using perspective by 
incongruity which includes perspective by incongruity as one of its pivotal terms, hence 
all these terms are equally implicated.   
Bureaucratisation of the imaginative is the process by which one possibility, of many, 
becomes ‘embodied in the realities of a social texture’ (language, ritual, government 
etc) (Burke 1984a:235). At the outset, an imaginative possibility usually starts out as 
Utopian, but as it permeates the social it becomes subject to ‘bureaucratic fixities’ (228) 




time, the process by which this vision is translated into action can never be perfected 
and hence there arise compromises and ‘unintended by-products…useful for comic 
critique’ (Burke 1984a:227). Reflexively, Burke regards perspective by incongruity as 
itself an example of the bureaucratisation of the imaginative. Perspective by incongruity 
is, he says, a formula which ‘bureaucratizes the mass production of perspectives’. While 
he accepts this leads inevitably to a deterioration of quality by making perspectives 
‘cheap and easy’ he argues that by ‘liquidating belief in the absolute truth of concepts 
[we are reminded] that the mixed dead metaphors of abstract thought are metaphors 
none the less’ (229). (Of course, it also serves to remind us that any attempt to reduce 
perspective by incongruity to method will likely undermine itself, thereby obeying 
Amiel’s law of irony.) 
 
 Casuistic stretching is a roguish strategy by which ‘one introduces new principles while 
theoretically remaining faithful to old principles’ (Burke 1984a:229). Burke cites as 
example, Weber’s celebrated paradox outlined in The protestant ethic and spirit of 
capitalism (2002) (first English translation 1930)  in which Weber posits that asceticism 
directly contributed to the accumulation of wealth and the rise of capitalism. In a 
subsequent ironic reversal this appeal to the protestant ethic was drawn on as 
justification for capitalist ideals. In this way, new ideals can be smuggled into the public 
domain by appeal to traditional virtues. However, casuistic stretching is always a 
double-edged and dangerous strategy, as Carlson (1992) notes in her historical analysis 
of the rise of feminism in America, in which the sphere of domesticity, as translated and 
reproduced in the world of work,  served to legitimise women’s entry to the workplace 
while simultaneously constraining their position within it. Casuistic stretching is thus 




social change ‘especially when used by a group that maintains its piety to the 
established hierarchy’ (Carlson 1992:29).In more general terms, Burke argues that all 
metaphorical extension exhibits such casuistry. Thus, through casuistic stretching 
language attempts to veil its inherent dialecticism.  
 
Clustering is the ‘significance gained by noting what subjects cluster about other 
subjects’ i.e. ‘what images b, c, d the poet introduces whenever he talks with 
engrossment of subject a’ (Burke 1984a:232). In this case, whatever the subject may say 
about ‘a’, his/her real feelings are displayed in the symbolic merger alluded to by the 
cluster b, c, d. Burke says,   ‘By charting clusters, we get our cues as to the important 
ingredients subsumed in “symbolic mergers”. We reveal, beneath an author’s “official 
front”, the level at which a lie is possible’ (233), thereby exposing the author’s 
underlying motivation.  
 
Pivotal terms act in the service of perspective by incongruity as a means to identify  the 
dialectical moment drawing out its various meanings and exemplifying Burke’s 
predilection for multiplication and the ‘heaping up’ of terms.  However, while 
acknowledging Burke’s undoubted creative outpouring, Macksoud  (1969) makes the 
very reasonable point that Burke gives little away in terms of how to actually undertake 
a study employing perspective by incongruity. Of course, Burke was a one-off, 
endowed with an almost instinctive feel for language as poetry with no need of a 
systematic method to guide his analysis. He was no doubt aware of the dangers that 
such a reduction to method would give rise to (as the bureaucratisation of the 
imaginative). Others of a less esoteric bent have attempted to divine method from his 




of rational purification is a loss of the paradigmatic comic frame within which a 
Burkean dialectical analysis is conducted.  This is apparent, for example, in Berthold’s 
(1976) cluster analysis of J. F. Kennedy’s rhetoric. However, some guidelines may be 
adduced through example, as I now show. 
 
Developing perspective by incongruity as ‘method’ 
Burke (1984b:74) uses the term ‘piety’ to mean a ‘sense of what properly goes with 
what’ (emphasis original) giving rise to a particular ‘interpretative network’. 
Perspective by incongruity, by contrast, is ‘impious’, Burke’s term for any action which 
‘attacks the kinds of linkage already established’  (Burke 1984b:87). Impieties therefore 
interrupt the normalised assumptions underpinning interpretive networks. The religious 
allusion in the metaphor of impiety is suggestive of the heretical intent of PI as 
considered within the comic frame.  
Impiety is clearly evident in the three examples discussed in this paper: trained 
incapacity (Burke 1984b; Merton 1940; Veblen 1914, 1918); functional stupidity 
(Alvesson and Spicer 2012); and interpassivity (a condensation of interactivity and 
passivity) (Pfaller 2003; Žižek 1998). The ‘moral’ dimension in each of these terms is 
clearly apparent;  in each case, a decently upright term is juxtaposed with one more 
dubious in its associations which, confronting each other, serve to set up the dialectical 
moment and the possibilities for ironic reversal in the space between the two.  
Trained incapacity 
The term ‘trained incapacity’ was coined by Thorstein Veblen, author of the classic 




developed by Burke (1984b) who defines it as ‘that state of affairs whereby one’s very 
abilities can function as blindnesses’. Burke goes on, 
 
One adopts measures in keeping with his past training – and the very soundness of 
his training may lead him to adopt the wrong measures. People may be unfitted by 
being fit in an unfit fitness. (Burke 1984b:10) 
 
Increasing specialisation therefore ‘widens the candidate’s field of ignorance’ (Veblen 
1918:147).  
 
While there have been many studies that have drawn on the construct of trained incapacity  
(e.g  Aylett 2013; Herppich 2012; Kanter 1977),  Merton’s (1940) classic analysis remains 
the most faithful to the Burkean comic frame, opening up the multiplicity that dialectical 
analysis demands. Merton draws on trained incapacity and two related planned 
incongruities, Dewey’s ‘occupational psychosis’ and Warnotte’s  ‘déformation 
professionelle’ (professional deformation) in an examination of Weber’s sociological 
analysis of bureaucracy, showing how these constructs actively, and ironically, undermine 
the goals of the organisation. Organisational psychosis, according to Burke (1984b:38), 
was used by Dewey to mean a conditioning of the mind in response to particular historical 
modes of production; nobody knows what Warnotte meant by déformation professionelle’, 
as it was published in French2. Weber’s classic analysis of bureaucratic institutions offers a 
rational account of organisations in an era of modernity (and even in today’s supposedly 
post-bureaucratic society is still highly relevant) paving the way for all the inherent 





Merton (1940:562) writes,  
 
The concepts of Veblen and Dewey refer to a fundamental ambivalence…Weber is 
almost exclusively concerned with what the bureaucratic structure attains: 
precision, reliability, efficiency. This same structure may be examined from 
another perspective provided by the ambivalence. 
 
Thus, Merton demonstrates how bureaucratic organisations demand ‘methodical, 
prudent and disciplined’ attention to work, depending ‘ultimately upon infusing group 
participants with appropriate attitudes and sentiments’ (562). This results in a 
displacement of goals such that an instrumental value becomes a terminal value. Thus, 
rules become an end in themselves, giving rise to rigidity and an inability to adjust to 
circumstance. Conformity to the rules leads to the fetishisation of red tape and the birth 
of the ‘bureaucratic virtuoso…who never forgets a single rule binding his action and 
hence is unable to assist many of his clients’ (563). Here Merton, the skilled magician3, 
conjures his own nicely ironic incongruity. The bureaucrat therefore fails to see beyond 
a narrow horizon to the genesis of rules and regulations: ‘He does not understand that 
every rationalized order is only one of many forms in which socially conflicting 
irrational forces are reconciled’ (Mannheim 1960:105). 
 
The bureaucratic virtuoso raises efficiency to an art form. Efficiency is another of  
Burke’s pivotal terms (Burke 1984a:248) defined as an ambivalent construct which 
‘endangers proper preservation of proportion’. Thus efficiency, as an ‘abstract essence’, 
seeks to remove all but the inessential. (Burke, in a whimsical moment, proposes the 




efficiency of ‘smiliness’.) In the same way the bureaucrat virtuoso efficiently abstracts 
the values underpinning rules, as optimal procedures undertaken according to prescribed 
norms, leaving behind an essence of pure red tape.  
 
The bureaucrat virtuoso’s identification with work as a way of life gives rise to a 
‘process of sanctification’ (Merton,1940:565; emphasis original), 
 
This is to say that through sentiment-formation, emotional dependence upon 
bureaucratic symbols and status, and affective involvement in spheres of 
competence and authority, there develop prerogatives involving attitudes of moral 
legitimacy which are established as values in their own right, and are no longer 
viewed as merely technical means for expediting administration. 
 
Rules become sacred, to be followed with a religious fervour. Merton remarks an 
‘impersonality’ arising from this sanctification, which manifests as an air of detachment 
from the client. This, he claims, arises from a tendency to categorise problems as types 
with specific associated remedies, whereas the client tends to see their case from a 
personal perspective requiring a unique solution. Thus, the bureaucrat-client conflict 
‘often derives from interaction on impersonal terms when personal treatment is 
individually demanded’ (Merton 1940:568). This can produce a charge of arrogance 
which may be relevant to today’s apparent mistrust of experts in the current context of 
‘post truth’4. The rhetoric of ‘service’  (to ‘the people’/clients) which underpins claims 
to action by politicians, civil service and professionals of all kinds, could form the basis 
of a cluster analysis: the sense of humility implied actively contradicted in the 




procedures of the bureaucrat virtuoso creates loyalty to the institution but stifles 
creativity. Trained incapacity arising out of bureaucratic structures thus gives rise to the 
interesting unanticipated consequence that too much commitment to the organisation 
results in stagnation and the inability to adapt. 
 
Merton’s analysis has, however, been subject to critique. Subsequent empirical 
investigations have not fully endorsed his findings of the power of bureaucracies to 
mould workers’ ‘personality’ as Merton asserts. Moreover, Schoenberger (1997) argues 
that trained incapacity does not necessarily produce resistance to change and stagnation 
per se, but may equally exist in a dynamic situation in which the entrenched cultural 
norms of the organisation drive dysfunctional, though no doubt highly efficient, re-
structuring processes. In these situations trained incapacity does not lead to 
sanctification of the rules, but instead drives organisations down narrow conduits as a 
result of the bureaucratisation of the imaginative (an instance of paving the cow-path).  
However, Merton’s analysis can be viewed as a satirical account of the ‘ideal-type’ 
bureaucracy (Mannheim 1960) and the limits to rationality of the bureaucratic 
organisation. Merton adopts a Burkean  ‘conscientious irresponsibility’ in following the 
idea to the end of the line for the sake of the dialectic exercise, and by so doing reveals 
the reductio ad absurdum inhabiting the truly rational. The analysis thus lies squarely in 
the comic frame producing the optimistic message of the triumph of the humanly 
irrational over the rational efficiency of the bureaucracy: the most ardent adherents of 
bureaucratic organisation in the end orchestrate its subversion and ruin. Trained 





Though not all social scientists have embraced fully the stance of ‘conscientious 
irresponsibility’ in their analyses, trained incapacity has proved to be a fruitful and 
enduring construct in the analysis of organisational behaviours and has spawned a 
number of related planned incongruities. Thus, Louis Schneider’s (1975:331) 
‘incompetent competence’ of the educational professional is based on the notion that, 
‘You hurt where you are supposed to help, and you show some aptitude for doing so via 
the instrumentalities and skills that are supposed to be helpful’. This could be developed 
as a theoretical tool to examine professional practices more widely; Argyris (1986:74) 
coined the term ‘skilled incompetence’ ‘whereby managers use practiced routine 
behaviour (skill) to produce what they do not intend (incompetence)’. Argyris helpfully 
sets out the ‘Four easy steps to chaos’ – but warns this should only be attempted by the 
skilled manager. An extensive literature has developed around paradox and decision-
making in organisational contexts (Watson 2013), indicative of the intrinsic 
ambivalence which infects all attempts to organise (the term ‘organisation’ certainly 
engages in a bit of casuistic stretching).  
 
Functional stupidity 
A more recently coined PI which retains some affinities with trained incapacity is 
provided by Alvesson and Spicer’s (2012) ‘stupidity-based theory of organizations’ in 
which they develop a theory of ‘functional stupidity’ as  
 
inability and/or unwillingness to use cognitive and reflective capacities in anything 
other than narrow and circumspect ways. It involves a lack of reflexivity, a 
disinclination to require or provide justification, and avoidance of substantive 





Functional stupidity is seen as an attribute of today’s post-bureaucratic organisations 
(‘post’ here signifying ‘development of’, rather than ‘break from’). Stupidity is clearly 
understood to be an organisational imperative rather than a personal attribute, defined as 
an ‘organizationally supported inability or unwillingness to mobilize one’s cognitive 
capacities’ specifically in the areas of: reflexivity, justification and substantive 
reasoning (1199).  It becomes functional in what the authors term the ‘economy of 
persuasion’ characterised by a focus on the manipulation of symbols ‘often in the form 
of attempts to develop strong corporate cultures and identities, corporate branding, and 
charismatic leadership, exercised often through stupidity management’ (1202). Through 
these persuasive forces, employees become aligned with the visions and values of the 
organisation, engaging in what amounts to a willing suspension of disbelief, effectively 
leaving their critical faculties at the door. Through functional stupidity  ‘organizational 
members are able to adopt a more relaxed attitude to reflexivity, critical scrutiny or 
justification’ which frequently assists the smooth running of the organisation. Hence, 
employees in knowledge intensive businesses develop habits of ‘stupidity self-
management’.  
 
Paulsen (2016) has conducted an ethnographic investigation of the Swedish Public 
Employment Service, a technology of the State for monitoring and ‘activating’ the 
unemployed, in which functional stupidity is drawn on as a theoretical tool to explain a 
marked degree of employee disengagement. Paulsen distinguishes functional stupidity 






the employees are aware of shortcomings and absurdities in the organization, what 
separates functional stupidity from other modes of compliance is that the reflective 
awareness is  – momentarily – pushed back to make room for myopic focus on 
instrumental issues. (Paulsen 2016:204) 
 
Thus, in effect, Paulsen’s workers understood full well the contradictions and 
irrationalities in their work but adopted a functionally stupid attitude in order to get the 
job done. (Much in the same way that social scientists, the vast majority of whom will 
have written a paper on some aspect of neoliberalism or ‘the New Public Management’, 
are well aware that they are immersed within the same discourses in the university but 
embrace it anyway). In effect, we may say that Paulsen’s workers are knowingly aware 
of the bureaucratic diktats that pervade even the most ‘post’ of post-bureaucratic 
organisations yet perform as if they buy into it – they are ambivalent bureaucrats. In 
particular, employees in the study adopted functional stupidity when applying 
organisational procedures for dealing with clients. On reflection they fully understood 
the futility of these processes in terms of providing solutions to their clients’ problems, 
but while at work they not only applied the prescribed procedures but were capable of 
defending them too. Functional stupidity is therefore the rational response to the 
irrationalities presented  by an organisation which retains the word ‘Service’ while 
operating, in the words of one of Paulsen’s research participants, as a ‘giant control 
apparatus’ (195). Functional stupidity therefore affords a Kafka-esque analysis, giving 
rise to a ‘grotesque humour’ (Reiss, 1949). 
 
Alvesson and Spicer (2012) suggest that recognising the efficiency of functional 




unreflective approach to work, specifically through curtailing the critical attitudes of 
workers  (though they also point out that too much stupidity may have its downsides). 
Functional stupidity therefore offers a much bleaker satire on organisations than trained 
incapacity, becoming an insidious mechanism for managing and limiting substantive 




Interpassivity is the outsourcing of (passive) enjoyment through the delegation of 
passivity to some other object (Pfaller 2003; Žižek 1998). The concept derives from 
Lacanian psychoanalysis and the idea expressed by Lacan in his Ethics of 
psychoanalysis that after a busy day at work, ‘…preoccupied by the affairs of the day, 
by the pen that you lost, by the check you will have to sign the next day’, you can go to 
the theatre and the (Greek) chorus will do your emotional feeling for you, 
 
Your emotions are taken charge of by the healthy order displayed on the stage. The 
chorus takes care of them. The emotional commentary is done for you…Therefore. 
You don’t have to worry; even if you don’t feel anything, the chorus will feel in 
your stead (Lacan 2008:310) 
 
An undoubted pleasure is obtained in the condensation of the oppositions contained 
within interpassivity which points to the joke as the paradigmatic framing of any 
analysis using this construct. As Pfaller (2007:38) notes, Žižek’s philosophical method 
makes use of the joke as a theoretical tool: ‘it makes visible a theoretical structure in the 




another structure that appeared evident’. Thus, Pfaller says, self-confessedly 
misappropriating Freud, interpassivity is  doing theoretical ‘joke-work’. This is 
exemplified in Žižek’s (1989) classic example of interpassivity,  the Tibetan prayer 
wheel. A prayer is written on paper and inserted into the wheel which turns it 
automatically, thereby allowing the one praying to passively delegate the enjoyment of 
prayer, while they are able to get on (actively) with something else. (Being Žižek, of 
course, he suggests this allows the pray-er to ‘indulge in the most dirty and obscene 
fantasies’ (1989:34) at the same time as they are objectively praying).  Other examples 
cited include: downloading films onto a recording device which are then never watched; 
the canned laughter in sitcoms that replaces your own; and, curiously, the dog that eats 
your cake in your place (Pfaller 2003). (In my household my husband fulfils this role.)  
The academic’s habit of printing off research papers which are then never read (in effect 
outsourcing this pleasure to the printer) would also qualify. Thus, Žižek says: 
 
I am passive through the Other. I concede to the Other the passive aspects (of 
enjoying) while I can remain actively engaged. I can continue to work in the 
evening, while the VCR [video cassette recorder] passively enjoys for me; I can 
make financial arrangements for the deceased’s fortune while the weepers mourn 
[in my stead]. (Žižek 1998:10) 
 
The sense of ‘enjoyment’ here is predicated on the idea that our enjoyment is never 
spontaneous but emerges from the super-ego imperative ‘Enjoy!’ In this way 
interpassivity relieves us of this ‘monstrous duty’  we experience so often as a burden in 
our consumer-oriented culture as the command to self-actualise (whether through our 




enjoyment the interpassive giver does not really believe the other prays, eats, reads, 
laughs etc in their place but they act as if they do. Interpassivity is thus a ritual act 
which involves a ‘double delegation’: passive enjoyment is transferred to another 
object, while the belief that this is possible is delegated to some unidentified naïve 
observer. This belief is ‘an illusion without a subject’ (Pfaller 2003),  
 
With the help of an objective, anonymous illusion we can interpassively delegate 
all our pleasures and acts of consumption… to an interpassive medium. Somebody 
else - an anonymous other, not we - believes, then, in the equivalence and thinks 
that we were enjoying; and this anonymous belief in our enjoyment brings about 
the deep satisfaction that we experience when we never watch our VCR tapes. 
(Pfaller 2003, np) 
 
In this way the delegator is able to escape (momentarily) subjectification within the 
discourse, deriving a secret pleasure which Pfaller calls diebische Freude, a strict 
translation of which is ‘thievish joy’ (Walz, et al 2014).In effect, we recoil from what 
we are commanded to enjoy and hence derive satisfaction from outsourcing this 
enjoyment to an Other. Pressures to enjoy are legion. We do what we can to escape this, 
in the process deriving a small measure of gratification.  
 
Interpassivity as a theoretical tool has been taken up quite widely in analysing human 
behaviour in a range of contexts e.g. cynicism at work (Johnsen, et al 2009); marketing 
‘guilt free’ food (Haynes and Podobsky 2016); religious belief (Mackie 2013); social 




Walz et al. (2014) draw on it to frame their analysis of consumer behaviour in relation 
to ethical brands, a major marketing trend in recent years. Most research into this 
behaviour assumes that the purchaser gains feelings of pleasure arising from superior 
morality/altruism and that this forms part of an identity project. However, Walz et al. 
(2014) draw on interpassivity as an analytical tool to explain some counterintuitive 
findings of research which suggest that many consumers do not believe the claims made 
for the ethical products they purchase but behave as if they do. (Thus, they may know 
that the product has really been produced in a third world sweatshop but they are able to 
ignore this.) Walz et al. propose that interpassivity contributes to a more 
‘comprehensive’ understanding of the pleasure of buying ethical brands while providing 
an explanation for the illusion perpetrated in the act of ‘buying into’. In effect, in an 
ironic reversal, purchasing ethical brands ‘offers the individual a momentary escape 
from the obligation to be a responsible consuming subject’ (59). The ethical consumer 
both delegates the passive enjoyment of behaving ethically and the belief that this is 
possible, and in the process derives ‘thievish joy’ from being disburdened 
(momentarily) of the responsibility of being an ethical consumer. Thus, ‘the wish to 
escape the pressure of being a consumer, not self-actualization, is the primary focus of 
the interpassive subject’ (70). Although the analysis is developed specifically in relation 
to ethical brands, Walz et al. suggest that it may be applicable more widely to consumer 
behaviour.   
 
The contribution of perspective by incongruity to dialectical ironic analysis 
In all three examples given here, the potential of perspective by incongruity to 
contribute to sociological knowledge through affording explanatory power, providing 




too may be drawn on which support this. Goffman’s use of the ‘misplaced adjective’ 
(Fine and martin, 1990) has clear affinities. Fine and Martin describe this as a form of  
‘literary terrorism’ (99), exploding the claims being presented,  as for example in his use 
of the term ‘courtesy stigma’ – the contamination of the ‘normal’ by association with 
the stigmatised (Watson 2015a). Anderson and Warren (2011) make use of 
Schumpeter’s term creative destruction to analyse CEO of budget airline Ryan Air, 
Michael O’Leary’s, entrepreneurship. The authors use the term to analyse ambiguities 
in the construction and performance of entrepreneurial identities and conclude that ‘the 
idea of creative destruction has some explanatory power outside its normal domain of 
the evolutionary replacement of product or service’ (605). By contrast, Scoles (2018) 
coins her own term dynamic stability to characterise the ‘knowings-in-practice’ and 
‘learning strategies’ of  engineers in an emerging industry who had to navigate multiple 
and sometimes conflicting  arenas of practice in their daily work. Similarly, in a study 
of professional learning in an online masters-level course for teachers which was 
explicitly designed to develop critical thinking, the authors note the polite criticality  
shown by participants in online discussion forums (Watson et al  2016). While some 
research suggests that such politeness stands as a barrier to the development of critical 
thinking, the authors demonstrate  that, conversely, politeness was used collegially as a 
means to enable self and other to ‘perform criticality’ within the online space, thereby 
questioning the common assumptions of the field and opening up avenues  for further 
research and pedagogical innovation.  
 
It may be argued that while these examples clearly draw on incongruous juxtaposition 
to provide novel sociological insights they do not explicitly refer to Burke or employ 




possibilities promised in the  development of PI as a methodical approach: deliberately 
constructing incongruity through ‘verbal atom cracking’ in order to expose the 
dialectical moments inherent in the data, potentially offers a rigorous approach to 
sociological analysis.  
 
As has already been remarked, in yielding a method Burke gives little away. However, 
Overington (1977) manages to glean a three-step guide for dialectical analysis from 
Burke’s writings. First, ‘identify the modal motivational framework’ i.e. uncover the 
dominant discourses and ideological affiliations evident in the language. This will yield 
a collection of master terms relating to the ‘ruling elites’ and the associated ‘pieties’ that 
cluster around these terms. Second, develop an ‘ironic motivational terminology’ by 
constructing incongruous phrases from this list of master terms and ‘from whatever 
terms one’s own inventive genius will supply’. This will yield the dialectical clusters 
which open up the data and interrupt the pieties that normalise conceptualisations of the 
social. (The pivotal terms may then provide guidance in structuring this analysis). The 
third step is to offer the analysis up for public consumption, in order to give a ‘truer’ (at 
least alternative) explanation of human actions/events as a way of prompting avenues 
for change. In modern parlance this amounts to a consideration of ‘pathways to impact’. 
Planned incongruity may therefore be viewed as a means by which to operationalise  C 
Wright Mills’ ‘sociological imagination’ (Mills 1959) the essence of which lies in the  
‘combination of ideas that no one expected were combinable’ (211). Offering something 
a little more concrete than Mills’ advice that one should re-arrange one’s filing system 






Perspective by incongruity constructs a world governed by the law of irony in which 
unanticipated consequences; adaptations that once made impede more effective ones; 
development through conflict; contradiction, paradox and negation; goal shifts; and the 
dissolution of conflict in the coalescence of opposites are commonplace (Schneider, 
1971). In considering this list, Overington (1977) says Burke is concerned only with the 
oppositions arising through incongruity. This might appear to limit the insights to be 
gained from applying a Burkean methodology. However, it could be argued that all 
Schneider’s  ‘meaning clusters’  can be subsumed within the idea of opposition as a 
dialectical epistemology. Thus, Schneider (1971:677) writes, ‘no dialectic would have 
any value that did not indicate precisely how, say, vice becomes virtue or virtue, vice’. 
This is evident in each of the three planned incongruities discussed here in detail, 
allowing us to understand how too much loyalty disadvantages organisations; how 
values become displaced giving rise to goal shifts; how the realisation of values may 
lead to their renunciation; how entrenched cultures prevent the uptake of new ideas and 
so on. In short, the infinity of ways in which the social world is subject to the 
unintended consequence, which Merton (1936:894)  says ‘has been treated by virtually 
every substantial contributor to the long history of social thought’ and Schneider argues 
is the most important issue the social sciences have to deal with. By drawing on the 
ontology of the comic frame situated within ‘humorous discourse’ (Mulkay, 1988), 
perspective by incongruity makes manifest the ambiguities, tensions, multiplicities and 
paradoxes which characterise social organisation. Without this perspective we find 
ourselves in the position of one of Franz Kafka’s heroes, ‘seeking to unravel the 
mysteries of the irrational by rational means’ (Reiss 1949: 542). The contribution of PI 
as method to sociological inquiry is therefore through prescriptive un-direction as 





Perspective by incongruity as methodology and method, of course, has its limitations. 
Brown (1983:543) writes, ‘sociological theory, when it is good theory, illuminates its 
audience and its subject matter with dialectically ironic insights’, the extent to which a 
PI constitutes a good analytical tool is dependent on the theoretical suppositions it 
dialectically juxtaposes. Moreover, perspective by incongruity is a process which itself 
tends towards bureaucratisation of the imaginative in the same way that metaphors 
become deadened through incorporation and so lose their force, as was noted earlier. 
Finally, one may note Schneider’s (1975:332) caution that though this form of analysis 
offers a valuable contribution we should, in seeking to preserve an ‘essential sanity’,  be 
wary of  an excessive and (unnecessary) ‘irony-mongering’; but he concludes, soberly, 
that with ‘the appropriate restraints the disciplined sociologist should be able to 
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1. Space precludes an in depth examination of these thinkers. Ball (1973) cites among them Simmel, 
Tocqueville, Weber, Park, Mead, and Freud. To which we should certainly add Karl Marx. Marx himself was 




                                                                                                                                                                                    
clearly something of an ironist as his famous epithet about history repeating itself first as tragedy and then as 
farce, attests. 
 
2 Josephson (1952:111) provides a footnote. ‘…Later, Warnotte also referred to the bureau as a little 
community, with an atmosphere of secrecy and anxiety. In his study of "professional deformation" he has 
described "tragedies" of the "internal life" of bureaucracy. Daniel Warnotte, "Bureaucratie et 
Fonctionnarisme," Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie, No. 2 (April-June 1937), pp. 219-260. 
 
3 Born Mayer Robert Schkolnick, Merton changed his name as an amateur stage magician, having been advised 
that Merlin was rather clichéd (Watson, 2015a). 
4 Following the Brexit vote in the UK (2016), Michael Gove, leading ‘out’ campaigner, wrote: ‘People in this 
country have had enough of experts’ Financial Times, 03.06.16,  https://www.ft.com/content/3be49734-29cb-
11e6-83e4-abc22d5d108c. This appeal to popularism was taken up by Donald Trump in his presidential 
campaign. 
 
